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The World Trading System at the Crossroads
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the Era of Regionalism
by Peteri Nunnenkamp
CONTENTS
The multilateral trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round have stagnated for years. At the
same time, the world economy has witnessed a strong revival of regional trade arrange-
ments. This juxtaposition suggests that major trading partners are drifting away from the
GATT.
Systemic weaknesses in the GATT framework, particularly the lack of effective sanction
mechanisms, and the overly ambitious agenda of the Uruguay Round have rendered it diffi-
cult to reach a multilateral trade accord. In the EC, the Internal Market programme has been
given priority over the GATT negotiations. And the recent move by the United States
towards regionalism also threatens to undermine the basis upon which multilateralism
could rest in the future.
The future of the world trading system depends critically on whether the trading partners
realise that regionalism cannot be defeated successfully by forming countervailing pro-
tectionist blocs. To prevent a further erosion of the fundamental GATT principle of most-
favoured-nation treatment, sweeping decisions are required in three respects:
— In concluding the Uruguay Round, swiftness is more important than completeness.
An immediate agreement should comprise all tentative achievements reached so far.
— Trade disputes left operf for the time being and new challenges such as ecologically
motivated trade barriers should be tackled in follow-up negotiations to be started
immediately after conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
— The EC and the United States should commit themselves to open regionalism by relax-
ing restrictive accession procedures. Moreover, GATT obligations must be extended
by a provision stipulating that third countries whose trade is negatively affected by
regional integration schemes will be compensated.
The responsibility to establish the conditions under which regional integration and multi-
lateral trade liberalisation could reinforce each other rests with the world's leading trading
partners. Open regionalism in a strong multilateral framework would not only break the
vicious circle that is eroding the world trading system, but may even induce a virtuous
circle of mutual trade liberalisation between regional groupings.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 19I. Introduction
Recent trends in trade policies provide a startling picture. It has become more and more
widely accepted that liberalising foreign trade is a powerful means to achieve an efficient al-
location of scarce resources and, thereby, foster economic development. Since the start of the
Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1986, dozens of developing countries throughout the world
have removed trade barriers unilaterally [GATT, a]. However, this move has not prevented
the persistent stalemate in international trade negotiations under the auspices of the GATT.
The era of multilateralism appears to have come to an end. At the same time, we have wit-
nessed a strong revival of regional trade arrangements. Partly as a response to integration
widening and integration deepening in Europe, the United States concluded the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Association (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, and have launched the En-
terprise for the Americas Initiative. New attempts at institutionalised regional integration
gained momentum in the Asian-Pacific region as well, the most prominent example being the
Malaysian initiative to form an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC).
In all probability, the pendulum will swing further towards bilateralism and regionalism if
GATT talks in the Uruguay Round will not be concluded successfully in the near future. The
formation of trading blocs would seriously interfere with an efficient division of labour at a
worldwide scale, if closer integration among partners were only achieved by erecting higher
trade barriers against outsiders. The ensuing welfare losses would be particularly high for
those developing countries that are not invited to participate in any of the major integration
schemes in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Latin America may develop closer links
with the United States, and Africa may continue to rely on preferential trade arrangements
with the EC. It is mainly the world-market-oriented economies in Asia which have to fear
most from major trading partners drifting away from GATT principles.
As stated by the Director General of the GATT, Arthur Dunkel, "the keys to a final con-
clusion (of the Uruguay Round) are held in a very few hands" [quoted in the Financial Times,
28 August 1992]. Regrettably, these hands are not those of the actors with a particularly keen
interest in preventing a further erosion of multilateralism, i.e. the Asian countries. The future
of the world trading system rather depends on those countries which are the driving forces of
regionalism today, i.e. the EC and the United States. Hence, the role of the EC and the United
States figures prominently in the subsequent discussion of international trade negotiations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section confronts the ambi-
tious working programme at the start of the Uruguay Round with the modest achievements
reached so far. The discussion will show that the major responsibility for the persistent im-
passe rests with the EC and the United States, i.e. the negotiation parties which initiated the
new round of GATT negotiations in the mid-1980s. Section III analyses the reasons for the
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gestions on an earlier version of this paper.serious delay in reaching a final agreement. It is argued that the Uruguay agenda was over-
loaded with too many issues, while major stumbling blocks to further trade liberalisation re-
ceived insufficient attention in the early phases of the negotiations. This refers to the conflicts
with regard to agriculture in the first place. Based on a critical assessment of the behaviour of
major actors, the chances for a liberal world trading system are evaluated (Section IV). The
focus is on the possible conflict between multilateralism and regionalism. Possible ways to
reconcile both concepts are discussed in Section V. Section VI summarises and provides
some clues on new challenges which the world trading system is going to face in the future.
II. The Uruguay Round: Persistent Struggles over an (Over-) Ambitious
Agenda
Previous GATT negotiations on multilateral trade liberalisation, e.g. the Tokyo Round of
1973-1979, had focused on tariff reductions for manufactured goods plus a limited number of
specific issues such as liberalising trade in tropical goods. By these standards, the agenda of
the Uruguay Round was much more comprehensive and represented "the most complex and
ambitious programme of negotiations ever undertaken by GATT" [GATT, 1986, p. 1]. The
subsequent topics figured prominently on the agenda [Hauser, 1991; Langhammer, 1991, pp.
3 f.; Schultz, Weise, 1992]:
— The transparency of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) was to be improved. Open questions and
ambiguities inherited from the preceding Tokyo Round were to be clarified.
— Sectors considered to be sensitive, particularly textiles and clothing as well as agricul-
ture, were to be reintegrated into the GATT and subjected to the principles of non-
discrimination and obligatory liberalisation.
— Safeguard clauses, emergency provisions, countervailing measures, and anti-dumping
procedures were to be defined more rigorously to prevent an abuse of these instruments.
— New areas were to be subjected to GATT rules. This applied to trade in services, trade-
related investment measures (TRIMs) such as local-content requirements, and trade-
related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) such as patents and copyrights.
— Dispute settlement in the case of an alleged breach of GATT rules was to become more
efficient and binding. An improved monitoring of the contracting parties' trade policies
was to be established.
All in all, it was attempted in the Uruguay Round to stop the trend of exceptions to the va-
lidity of GATT principles becoming the rule and to extend GATT discipline to new trade is-
sues. In many respects, however, vaulting ambitions were frustrated during the negotiations.
Tentative agreements were reached mainly in areas where producer interests in importing
countries were not affected significantly. This applied to the further liberalisation of trade in
tropical products, for example.
1 Other negotiating groups focused their attention on defini-
1 However, product coverage was defined in an arbitrary fashion. For example, sugar and bananas were not
considered to fall into the category of tropical products.tions and classification issues. In this way, conflicts between trading partners were camou-
flaged for some time, e.g. with respect to services. From the beginning, negotiations proved
to be protracted in sensitive areas such as agriculture, textiles and clothing, TRIMs, and
TRIPs. Similarly, the application of safeguard clauses in the case of a sudden import surge
(Art. XIX GATT) and of trade restrictions by developing countries for balance-of-payments
purposes (Art. XVIII: B GATT) remained heavily disputed. Not surprisingly, the progress in
trade negotiations achieved until the scheduled conclusion of the Uruguay Round by end-
1990 was inversely related to the producer interests and adjustment needs in importing coun-
tries.
The failure to reach an agreement at the GATT Council of Ministers in Brussels in Decem-
ber 1990 was mainly because the EC refused to liberalise substantially its highly intervention-
ist Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). According to OECD calculations, the absolute
amount of transfers granted to agricultural producers was by far the highest in the EC (Table
I).
2 Furthermore, agricultural protection in the EC was mainly achieved through administered
food prices, i.e. extremely distortionary instruments. Consumers contributed nearly 60 per
cent to the transfers to agriculture. This share was even higher for Japan and some EFTA
countries, but significantly lower for the United States (37 per cent).









































Source: The Economist [1992] on the basis of OECD calculations.
The concessions offered by the EC with regard to agriculture were considered insufficient
by the United States and the Cairns Group of 14 agricultural exporters (among them are: Ar-
gentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land). The proposed reduction of internal support for agricultural producers in the EC and the
alleviation of market access for external competitors through a reduction of trade barriers re-
mained significantly behind the respective demands of the EC's trading partners. Further-
more, the EC declined to make any binding commitment to reduce export subsidies. The re-
in per capita terms, EC transfers to agriculture ranked between Australia, paying hardly any subsidies, and
Finland, which represented the most extreme case among the highly protectionist EFTA countries.jection by the EC, as well as by Japan and South Korea, of a last minute compromise pro-
posal by Sweden, i.e. another country with high protection in agriculture (Table 1), triggered
a temporary breakdown of GATT negotiations. All tentative agreements achieved so far in
other areas were placed at everybody's disposal again, since the United States and the Cairns
Group had made their approval contingent on the resolution of the conflict in agriculture.
Agriculture has remained the pivotal point since the GATT negotiations were resumed in
1991. However, EC-US conflicts prevailed throughout the Uruguay Round in other important
respects as well [Langhammer, 1991, pp. 13 ff.]. A long-standing controversy relates to uni-
lateral tariff concessions granted to developing countries outside the GATT negotiations. The
EC considers the preferences to be a major instrument of its aid policies. The breach of the
principle of non-discrimination has proved to be a two-edged sword for the perceived bene-
ficiaries, however, since preference margins are eroded by restrictive rules-of-origin require-
ments of the EC. The attempt by the United States to subject unilateral trade preferences to
GATT rules (i.e., regarding them as a waiver) was frustrated by the Enabling Clause through
which the preferential treatment of developing countries had been incorporated into the
GATT framework during the Tokyo Round.
Both the EC and the United States argued that a transition period of at least 10 years would
be required to phase out the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) and to reintegrate textile trade into
the GATT. Developing and newly industrialising countries pressed for a significantly shorter
transition period. Apart from timing, the liberalisation of trade in textiles and clothing was
hindered by the EC's inclination to discrimination and selectivity. The Community insisted
on MFA quota extension to be based on the existing bilateral agreements. By contrast, the
United States proposed to gradually replace country-specific quotas by a global quota and to
allow all textile suppliers to compete for an expanding overall import volume. Similarly, the
EC remained rather isolated in its request to apply the safeguard clause of Art. XIX GATT
selectively against trading partners which are held responsible for an exceptional import
surge.
Another unresolved issue inherited from previous GATT negotiations concerned subsidies.
Again, the struggle on which subsidies are GATT inconsistent was mainly between the EC
and the United States. The United States strived for a general ban on producer subsidies and
insisted on imposing countervailing duties in the case of export subsidies. The EC tolerates
export subsidies and those internal subsidies which do not adversely affect external trade. As
the trade effects of internal subsidies are difficult to evaluate in quantitative terms, any
agreement along the lines suggested by the EC would face serious enforcement problems.
Finally, EC-US disputes hindered the liberalisation of trade in services. Here, it is the
United States which are reluctant to acknowledge the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle
for important services, notwithstanding that the US government was the driving force to place
the liberalisation of trade in services high on the agenda of the Uruguay Round. Exemptions
from MFN treatment are sought for air and maritime transport, financial services, and tele-
communications [Commonwealth Secretariat, 1992, No. 45, pp. 13 f.]. Access to service
markets in the United States is made conditional on reciprocal concessions by the respective
trading partner. Controversies with the EC are focused on telecommunications and audio-
visual services. The United States feel discriminated against EC suppliers and complain about
the dominance of public monopolies in EC service markets.Similar to major industrialised countries, developing and newly industrialising countries
asked for trade liberalisation in those service subsectors where they possess comparative ad-
vantages such as in construction services. They also pressed for a free movement of labour.
On the other hand, they strongly resist free market access to their highly protected markets for
financial services as long as domestic banks and insurance and securities companies cannot
withstand fiercer competition from abroad. A similar discrepancy is to be observed as con-
cerns the reaction of developing countries to the attempted extension of the GATT framework
to TRIPs and TRIMs. In the case of TRIPs, they forcefully argued in favour of free trade and
opposed an extensive interpretation of intellectual property rights, which they consider to be a
powerful protectionist means at the disposal of industrialised countries. By contrast, an
agreement on TRIMs was resisted by developing countries because they want to maintain the
option to interfere with the sourcing and marketing decisions of private investors.
3
More generally, developing countries (including the newly industrialising economies
(NIEs)) insisted on preferential treatment in almost all negotiation groups during the Uruguay
Round by referring to the above mentioned Enabling Clause. They have thus helped the fur-
ther erosion of the principle of non-discrimination. The majority of developing countries is
not prepared to subject themselves to greater discipline with regard to import restrictions for
balance-of-payments purposes (Art. XVIII: B GATT). On the other hand, the world-market-
oriented economies among them demand greater discipline of the EC and the United States in
applying anti-dumping procedures, a request which they share with Japan. The permanent
threat of dumping allegations also undermines structural reform programmes of those devel-
oping countries which had traditionally been rather inward-looking.
4 A further disincentive to
internal reform efforts is the resistance of industrialised countries to take into account unilat-
eral import liberalisation by developing countries when it comes to the balancing of trade
concessions made during the Uruguay Round.
III. Causes for the Persistent Impasse
Little progress has been made in resolving the above mentioned trade conflicts since the fail-
ure to reach an agreement in December 1990. Several attempts at a "political breakthrough"
foundered on the discord between major actors [Schultz, Weise, 1992, p. 656]. The so-called
Dunkel Paper fared alike. In December 1991, the chairman of the Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee (TNC) presented a consolidated package of tentative agreements in the form of a draft
Final Act.
5 This move did not prevent 1992 from becoming another lost year as to the con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round.
On TRIMs, see also Balasubramanyam [1991].
The threat of anti-dumping allegations is present, although trade policy reforms by developing countries
aimed at removing the previous disincentives to exports relative to the production for the domestic market,
rather than being targeted towards outright export subsidisation.
For a summary of this 440 pages document, see Commonwealth Secretariat [1992, No. 44].The difficulties in concluding the Uruguay Round are partly due to the systemic weak-
nesses of the GATT framework.
6 The MFN principle has been seriously eroded by granting
preferential treatment especially to developing countries, whereby the issue of trade liberal-
isation was intermingled with distributional concerns. Important sectors such as agriculture
and textiles and clothing were exempted from GATT discipline. Contracting parties were in-
genious in applying new protectionist measures such as so-called voluntary export restraints,
which are not covered by GATT rules. In addition, the private sector was encouraged to man-
age trade by means of industry-to-industry arrangements. Affected countries find it difficult
to provide conclusive evidence on the injury caused by violations of GATT rules, since the
counterfactual is typically open to debate. Finally, the enforcement of GATT rules suffers
from a serious lack of effective sanction mechanisms.
Institutional shortcomings have characterised the GATT from its very beginning. They are
no sufficient explanation for the particularly serious problems in concluding the Uruguay
Round. Hence, an additional argument relates to the differences between the Uruguay Round
and earlier GATT negotiations. The most striking difference is the lengthy "shopping list" of
trade issues on the Uruguay agenda, while previous rounds were more targeted on specific is-
sues of topical interest. The overly ambitious agenda contributed to the maximisation of
conflicts among negotiating parties and rendered the balancing of trade concessions extremely
difficult. As a consequence, the multilateral trade negotiations have been largely replaced by
continuing bilateral struggles over specific issues, among which the EC-US dispute on agri-
culture is only the most widely publicised one.
In contrast to earlier expectations, the 1992 reform of the CAP did not provide a suffi-
ciently strong impetus for a quick resolution of trade conflicts in agriculture.
7 In May 1992, a
drastic reduction of internal support prices was agreed among EC member countries for the
first time in the history of the CAP (minus 30 per cent within three years for grain, minus 15
per cent for beef). However, price-related support arrangements were maintained for other
agricultural products, and compensatory transfer payments to prevent income losses of grain
and beef producers were not decoupled from production. The reform of the cereals market,
though an important step in the right direction, was identical to the acreage-based support
scheme of the EC for oilseeds, which a GATT panel had judged twice to be non-conforming
with GATT rules upon request of the United States. Accordingly, the new acreage-based
transfer payments do not fall into the production-neutral "green box", as defined in the GATT
negotiations, but rather into the "yellow box" of subsidies to be eliminated over time.
Conflicts in agriculture continued even after protracted EC-US negotiations had resulted in
a compromise on oilseeds in November 1992 [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 November
1992]. The EC agreed to restrict the oilseed acreage to 5.1 million hectares and to reduce the
volume of production dumped on to the world market on a product-by-product basis by 21
per cent within six years. Hopes for a speedy GATT accord, lifted by this compromise, faded
again when France objected to the terms of the settlement and threatened to veto it when it
comes before the EC Council of Ministers for a vote.
^ For an overview on GATT inherent shortcomings, see Hauser [1991].
7 For details of the reform, see Koester and von Cramon-Taubadel [1992].Further delay in concluding the Uruguay Round may lie ahead, even though it might be ex-
pected that Japan and South Korea will finally open their rice markets in view of their strong
dependence on a liberal world trading system. Notwithstanding repeated warnings to propose
as few changes as possible to the draft Final Act of December 1991, there is still the risk that
the package will be unravelled. The United States insist on bilateral sanctions if the proposed
anti-dumping rules do not ensure "fair trade". Furthermore, the US government has chal-
lenged the creation of the proposed Multilateral Trade Organisation, i.e. the umbrella institu-
tion that might supersede the GATT. It is feared that such an institution will not restrict its
activities to administering contractual obligations within the GATT framework, but may
compromise US sovereignty by interferring with US trade policies. Amendments to the draft
Final Act sought by the United States may induce other countries to follow suit in picking
specific agreements to their liking, rather than signing the package as a whole. As argued be-
fore, this tendency is most pronounced with regard to the liberalisation of trade in services,
upon which tough bilateral bargaining is likely to continue.
Bilateral struggles over various trade issues might have been contained if the Uruguay
agenda had been targeted on some critical developments which threatened to undermine a lib-
eral world trading system. This refers to the mushrooming discrimination among trading
partners in the first place, by which the fundamental GATT principle of MFN treatment is in-
creasingly eroded. The EC has been a driving force in this respect. Multilateralism has never
taken precedence over regionalism in the EC's external trade policies. Since recently, it has
become even more difficult to strengthen multilateralism by reversing the trend towards dis-
criminatory trade practices. Arguably, the move towards regionalism by the United States in
the early 1990s has removed another pillar on which multilateralism might rest.
All in all, it appears that those who initiated the Uruguay Round in 1986, i.e. the EC and
the United States, block it today, while those who resisted it then, mainly the developing
countries, today want it to succeed without further delay [de Pury, 1992; Davenport, 1992].
This suggests that a closer look into the underlying motivations of the major actors in the
Uruguay Round may further help to explain the difficulties in achieving a multilateral trade
accord. The trade policy stance of the EC and the United States is not only important for ex-
plaining the persistent impasse of the Uruguay Round. It will also have a dominant impact on
the future shape of the world trading system.
IV. The Critical Actors: The EC and the United States
As concerns the EC, the Uruguay Round has vied for attention with integration deepening and
integration widening within Europe.
8 The opening of GATT negotiations in 1986 coincided
with the start of the EC's Internal Market programme. For quite some time, multilateral trade
issues have taken second place behind the 1992 project. There is reason to assume that the EC
did not have a strategy for the GATT negotiations but reacted defensively to US attacks on
the CAP [Pelkmans, Murphy, 1991]. The mandate of the EC Commission was restricted by
For details, see Gundlach et al. [1993].10
diverging interests among member countries, which are the contracting parties to the GATT.
An efficient mechanism for internal arbitration is largely lacking.
9 Consensus building among
EC members is time consuming, and more often than once EC proposals merely represented a
careful balancing of country-specific benefits and costs rather than true support of a multilat-
eral trading system.
The EC's mandate in GATT negotiations was further restricted by the attempt to protect
the privileged trading position of associated countries, particularly the former colonies in the
ACP group. In pursuit of its own broad interpretation of Art. XXIV GATT, which provides a
waiver for deviations from MFN treatment for regional trade agreements, the EC maintains a
multilayer system of trade preferences vis-a-vis third countries on a reciprocal or unilateral
basis (Figure 1). Preferences are granted in the context of free trade agreements (e.g. with
EFTA countries), through a wide range of association and cooperation agreements (including
the Lome Convention) and by the Community's GSP scheme. Even before the collapse of
socialism in Eastern Europe, the bulk of external EC imports originated from countries par-
ticipating in some form of preferential trade scheme [GATT, 1991, p. 7].
Recently, the discriminatory stance of EC trade policy has gained further momentum. Inte-
gration widening has been initiated in several respects:
— An EC-EFTA agreement envisages the formation of a European Economic Space,
whereby earlier free trade arrangements will be extended to the free mobility of capital
and labour.
— Several EFTA countries applied for full EC membership.
— The so-called Europe Agreements which the EC concluded with the former Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary and Poland in 1991 promoted these countries from the bottom to close
the top of the pyramid of trade preferences (Figure 1). The ultimate objective is full EC
membership. Though more limited in scope, trade concessions were offered to other
post-socialist countries as well.
While EC trade policies towards European neighbours were liberalised significantly, high
barriers against non-European exports are basically unchanged. Initial concerns that, in the
course of European integration, the EC would turn more and more inward-looking have been
overly pessimistic: "There is little evidence of any recent major intensification of protective
measures on the part of the EC" [GATT, 1991, p. 20; see also Pelkmans, 1992]. However,
discrimination and selectivity remain typical features of EC trade policy with regard to non-
European competitors. First, this is because of the traditionally large differences in protection
levels across sectors.
1
0 Exporters of agricultural products, textiles and clothing, coal and steel,
as well as automobiles are hit particularly hard. Second, the preferred protectionist instru-
ments such as "voluntary" export restraints and anti-dumping procedures clearly reflect the
EC's bias towards bilateralism, selectivity and discretion. Japan and NIEs in Asia were the
principal targets.
9 In contrast to all other areas of common EC policy, an annual progress report does not exist with regard to
trade policy.
1
0 For empirical evidence, see GATT [1991] and Hiemenz et al. [1990].11
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aThe following abbreviations are used: ACP: group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries under the Lome Conven-
tion; CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States, i.e. the former USSR republics; CMEA: the (former) Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance; CSFR: the (former) Czechoslovakia; GSP: generalised system of preferences; MFA: Multifibre
Agreement; QRs: quantitative trade restrictions.
Source: Gundlach et al. [1993, p. 18].
MFN treatment by the EC is effectively restricted to the United States [Davenport, 1990, p.
183]. It has been estimated that only 25 per cent of the EC's total trade was conducted on a
MFN basis, as compared to almost 90 per cent of US trade [Sideri, 1990, p. 29]. Hence, it is
hardly surprising that the EC took long to overcome its defensive attitude in the Uruguay
Round negotiations. That the EC has recently become a more constructive partner, for exam-
ple, with respect to the much disputed rules for trade in services, seems to have been contin-
gent on the progress made in completing the Internal Market [see also Gundlach et al., 1993].12
Internal liberalisation gave the EC greater negotiation leverage and expertise in areas such as
services, public procurement and technical standards. Likewise, the EC had to find an internal
consensus in favour of a reform of the CAP before the deadlock of multilateral negotiations
on agriculture could be broken. With European integration proceeding, the readiness of the
EC to contribute to a settlement of remaining disputes in the Uruguay Round has increased.
This seems to indicate that regional integration and a liberal world trading system are not
strictly antagonistic but may be reconciled, an issue to which I will return in the subsequent
section [see also Bhagwati, 1991b].
The higher political priority which the EC attached to the resolution of multilateral trade
conflicts is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to finally conclude the Uruguay Round.
This is mainly because multilateralism lost ground in the United States, where it had rela-
tively solid foundations until recently. The tendency to focus on domestic economic concerns,
to establish a free trade area in the Western Hemisphere as a countervailing force to European
integration, and to tackle trade disputes bilaterally is likely to gain further momentum under
the new US administration.
New uncertainties with regard to the outcome of multilateral trade negotiations relate to the
prolongation of the fast-track mandate in the first place. At the beginning of March 1993, the
authority of the President expires to submit a GATT deal to Congress for approval as a pack-
age, precluding Congress from dissecting an accord point by point and demanding amend-
ments. While President Clinton has announced to ask for the prolongation of the fast-track
mandate, it is still open whether Congress will agree [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15
February 1993]. Trade unions, a number of industries and environmentalists oppose the pro-
longation. There is an increasing inclination to unravel the draft Final Act of December 1991
and to renegotiate tentative agreements relating to market access, services, TRIPs, and tex-
tiles.
More generally, there is a mounting pressure by interest groups to protect US industries
facing adjustment problems and to react more swiftly to alleged dumping of foreign trade
partners. First moves in this direction are countervailing duties imposed on steel exports of 19
countries and the threat of retaliation against restrictive public procurement practices of the
EC [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 February 1993]. Further protectionist requests have
been filed by the automobile, oil and semi-conductor industries. The attempted revival of the
GATT inconsistent "Super 301" legislation fits into this picture. According to Section 301 of
US trade law, the administration may impose sanctions unilaterally against countries which
impede the access of US companies to their markets [Hauser, 1991, p. 11]. Bilateral trade
deficits are considered to be a criterion for unfair market access, which clearly contradicts the
multilateral GATT framework. Japan is the major target of Section 301 legislation. In Febru-
ary 1993, a bill was prepared which requires Japan to reduce its trade surplus with the United
States by 20 per cent per annum [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 February 1993]. The ex-
perience of the late 1980s shows, however, that the threat of trade sanctions may induce a
number of other countries, including Asian NIEs, to grant unilateral concessions in order to
escape an identification under Section 301 [Hiemenz, 1991].
All in all, US trade policy appears to aim increasingly at short-term job security. The
longer-term vision of revitalising the domestic economy through competitive pressures result-
ing from an open trading environment seems to be at the retreat. The new US administration
runs the danger of invalidating the earlier GATT initiatives launched by the previous admin-4e$ Instituts fur Weifwirtsci
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istration because bilateral arrangements raise suspicion among other negotiating parties about
the true US intentions [Hiemenz, 1991]. In other words, the United States risk the success of
the Uruguay Round which, in turn, is of utmost importance to prevent the fortification of
trading blocs. The future of the world trading system depends critically on whether the US
administration realises that regionalism cannot be defeated by regionalism [see also Nunnen-
kamp, 1992]. Furthermore, both the United States and the EC must ensure that regional
integration is not at the expense of third parties.
V. Liberal Trade between Integrated Regions: A Proposal
The above discussion provided first clues on the ambiguous relation between regional inte-
gration and multilateral trade liberalisation. On the one hand, successful integration at the re-
gional level may eventually help the resolution of trade conflicts with third parties.
1
1 On the
other hand, the formation of regional blocs to counteract regionalism elsewhere may further
undermine multilateralism. From an economic viewpoint, it would be unreasonable for the
world's leading trading nations, including the EC and the United States, to consider regional
integration as a substitute for an open multilateral trading system. US trade with its immedi-
ate neighbour Canada accounted for about 20 per cent of total US trade in 1990 (Table 2).
The share of intra-regional US exports was only slightly above one third if the region is de-
fined as encompassing the whole American continent. Intra-regional trade is much more ad-
vanced in the EC. Intra-EC trade increased to about 60 per cent of total EC trade for both ex-
ports and imports in 1990. However, EC exports to non-European destinations remained sig-
nificant (28.8 per cent). The share of non-European trade partners in total EC imports was of
a similar size, although it declined more rapidly during the 1980s. Preserving external com-
petition is of utmost importance for encouraging economic adjustment and restructuring as
well as constraining monopoly power at the regional level [see also Jacquemin, Sapir, 1991].
Hence, it is not only in the interest of outsiders but also in the longer term self-interest of
member countries that regional integration schemes do not result in protectionist trading
blocs.
To prevent an outcome of regional integration which would be at the expense of all trading
partners, though to different degrees, regional trade arrangements should be designed in a
way to dissipate fears of adverse trade effects on non-members, especially in Asia. This basi-
cally requires stricter GATT monitoring of regional trade arrangements. Art. XXIV GATT
authorises derogations from MFN treatment if free trade areas and customs unions cover
"substantially all" the trade among partner countries and do not raise trade barriers against
third countries. These vague requirements suffer from serious enforcement problems, how-
ever. None of the about 80 preferential trade arrangements that have been notified to the
1
1 For a similar reasoning, see Pelkmans [1992]. Lawrence [1991] strengthens the case for a positive relation
between regionalism in the EC and multilateral trade liberalisation by referring to historical evidence. It is
argued, for example, that the formation of the EC was an important impulse for the Kennedy Round of the
GATT in 1964-1967.14




































































































































GATT under Art. XXIV has been rejected as inconsistent with GATT obligations [Hufbauer,
Schott, 1993].
Any proposal to reconcile regional trade arrangements with multilateralism, so that both
concepts could co-exist or even reinforce each other, must rest on openness and external lib-
eralisation as the two principal building blocks.
1
2 First, integration schemes must be open to
new members which are ready to comply with the obligations of the regional trade accord.
Second, transparent mechanisms have to be implemented providing for compensation for
those non-member countries whose trade is adversely affected.
The first suggestion, i.e. openness, ensures that regional trade liberalisation may.spread be-
yond its primary boundaries. To this end, the accession procedures of integration schemes in
both Europe and the Western Hemisphere would have to be modified. While NAFTA mem-
bership is principally open to all countries without geographic limitations, any of the three
present members can veto new members. In practice, the near-term prospects for the en-
largement of NAFTA are limited. The United States are not ready to accept an accession re-
quired by highly competitive Asian NIEs, not to speak of Japan [ibid., p. 46].
Likewise, the EC is reluctant to accept new members except some EFTA countries. Re-
quests for full membership by post-socialist countries in Europe, and even more so by coun-
tries such as Turkey, have received a lukewarm response. Among the reasons for the limited
openness, concerns about mass migration induced by closer integration figure prominently.
However, the migrants' drain into the EC will continue even though the sending countries are
1
2 For similar suggestions, see Bhagwati [1991b], Lawrence [1991], Pelkmans [1992], and Hufbauer and
Schott [1993].15
denied the free movement of labour, i.e. one of the so-called four freedoms characterising the
Internal Market. At present, migration is to a large extent illegal. Restraining access to the EC
may even fuel (illegal) migration. Pronounced income differentials and high unemployment,
which tend to be perpetuated by the remaining trade barriers against would-be EC members,
provide strong incentives to migrate. Such incentives should rather be diminished. To this
end, the EC's integration strategy should be more concerned about extending the achieved
intra-EC liberalisation of trade and factor movements to other countries, rather than focusing
on integration deepening for a small club of Western European economies.
1
3 Eventually, a
broader economic club based on liberal principles, including liberal accession rules, is in the
interest of both present EC members and would-be members.
External liberalisation by the members of regional integration schemes, i.e. the second
building block of our proposal, might be achieved in different ways. Bhagwati [1991b, p. 77]
has suggested that any country that joins a free trade area must simultaneously reduce its ex-
ternal tariffs for all GATT members:
"A simple way to do this could be to modify Article XXIV to rule out free trade areas with diverse
tariffs by members and to permit only customs unions with common external tariffs. With most tariffs
bound, this would ensure that for the most part a substantial downward shift in tariffs would be a con-
sequence ... A surer but more heavy-handed way to ensure this would be to write in the requirement
that the lowest tariff of any union member on an item before the union must be part of the common
external tariff [ibid.].
An alternative suggestion, for which the support of major trading nations might be easier to
achieve, requires for compensation if regional integration results in trade diversion at the ex-
pense of non-members. In this respect, an earlier proposal to enforce the dismantling of trade
barriers erected by OECD countries against Third World exports through compensatory, ad-
ditional aid payments can be referred to.
1
4 To sanction the breach of agreed liberalisation
schedules, contingent compensation payments might be fixed according to the welfare losses
of trading partners from retained protectionist measures and distributed among the affected
countries under the auspices of an international institution. A similar compensation scheme
has been developed and operationalised by Hufbauer and Schott [1993, pp. 38 ff.] with
special regard to the trade diversion effects of regional integration schemes. Compensation
for those non-member countries whose trade is adversely affected would be determined by
the GATT Secretariat according to the following procedure:
First, the shares of intra-regional imports in total imports would be calculated for each
member country on an industry-specific basis. The development of these shares would be
evaluated at fixed time intervals starting with the implementation of the integration scheme.
Assuming that trade diversion at the expense of non-members results in higher shares of in-
tra-regional imports (and correspondingly lower shares of external imports), import categor-
ies with lower shares of intra-regional imports would be dismissed from further consideration
for compensation.
1
3 For a discussion on integration deepening versus integration widening, see Schmieding [1992].
1
4 For details, see Hiemenz [1989, pp. 14 f.] and Nunnenkamp [1991, p. 17].16
Second, for the remaining categories the question has to be addressed whether higher shares
of intra-regional imports are actually due to trade diversion. Higher shares may also result
from trade creation, i.e. higher ratios of imports from all sources to the member country's
consumption induced by regional integration. Compensation for non-member countries would
be reduced to the extent that the latter import penetration ratios increase over time.
1
5 Trade
diversion would then be given by the dollar value of the rise in intra-regional import shares
minus the dollar value of integration-induced trade creation.
Third, the compensation for trade diversion should be "paid" by a reduction of protectionist
measures against extra-regional imports of the respective categories. External liberalisation
would be required to an extent that produces a rise in extra-regional imports equivalent to the
calculated trade diversion effect.
Together with openness towards new members, the proposed compensation scheme for
trade diversion at the expense of non-members can prevent regional integration from degen-
erating into the formation of protectionist trading blocs. If both suggestions were followed
and strictly applied, regional integration might even provide a stimulus to liberalising world
trade in general. In the best of all circumstances, the recent revival of regionalism may
eventually result, though unintentionally, in a new era of multilateralism. Such a development
might be further encouraged if the proposed compensation were conditioned on reciprocal
commitments. Member countries of a regional integration scheme should be eligible for com-
pensation from another regional grouping only if they had agreed to reciprocal concessions
for any trade diversion caused by their own integration scheme.
VI. The Future of the World Trading System: Old Problems and New
Challenges
The multilateral trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round of the GATT have stagnated for
years. Major results are still pending, and an outright failure of the Round is not completely
out of question in early 1993. At the same time, we have witnessed a strong revival of re-
gional trade arrangements, especially in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The driving
forces of regionalism, i.e. the EC and the United States, also bear the main responsibility for
the protracted trade conflicts that have delayed the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. This
juxtaposition suggests that major trading partners are drifting away from the GATT.
The uncertainty surrounding the international trading system threatens to result in a vicious
circle. This uncertainty will lead more countries (especially small trading partners) to apply
for membership in regional trade arrangements as a safeguard against a breakdown of the
GATT [Paque, Soltwedel, et al., 1992, pp. 23 ff.]. Expectations that multilateralism has no
future can be self-fulfilling insofar as a move towards regionalism weakens the incentives of
joining countries to support the GATT system [see also Bhagwati, 1991a, p. 242], an effect
which could be observed in the past in the case of developing countries enjoying special pref-
1
5 For details of calculation, see Hufbauer and Schott [1993, pp. 40 f.].17
erences. Diminishing support for a liberal multilateral trading system would, in turn, increase
the risk that regional integration schemes degenerate into protectionist trading blocs. To pre-
vent such an outcome, which runs against the longer term interest of all trading nations, it is
of utmost importance that (i) the Uruguay Round is concluded as soon as possible, (ii) follow-
up negotiations are focused on major questions left open for the time being as well as on
some newly emerging trade issues, and (iii) adverse trade effects of regional trade arrange-
ments are scrutinised more effectively.
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round would reduce the prevailing uncertainty and,
thereby, the relative attractiveness of regionalism. In this respect, swiftness appears to be
more important than completeness. It has been shown that the overly ambitious agenda of the
Uruguay Round has delayed its conclusion from the beginning. Hence, an immediate agree-
ment should comprise all achievements reached so far. While such an undertaking is rela-
tively modest, it requires that major trading partners, particularly the United States, relax their
provisos according to which tentative agreements will become effective only after remaining
disputes have been settled. The required delinking of various trade issues may be encouraged
by a commitment of trading partners to start another round of GATT negotiations immedi-
ately after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and to focus future negotiations on major
unresolved problems plus a limited set of new challenges that have emerged recently.
The agenda of the next GATT Round should include the following items:
First, the further liberalisation of trade in agriculture must figure prominently. Most impor-
tantly, discrimination among agricultural exporters by the EC must be forestalled. This is be-
cause the EC may be tempted to shift part of the adjustment burden to non-European export-
ers of agricultural products once the Community cannot resist a speedy opening of its agricul-
tural markets for Eastern European exports in order to stem the inflow of surplus labour from
neighbouring countries [Paque, Soltwedel, et al., 1992, pp. 27 f.].
Second, the erosion of the MFN principle should be halted by reducing the number and
coverage of special trade preferences offered within and outside the GATT framework. De-
veloping countries should not resist this trend reversal as special preferences have typically
proven to be a mixed blessing. Especially the growing number of developing countries which
have liberalised their trade policies recently have a strong interest in securing the multilateral
trading system which threatens to be undermined by ever increasing discrimination.
Third, the issue of trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) will gain in relevance given
the inclination of many countries to extend trade restrictions to foreign investment designed
to circumvent traditional barriers to trade (e.g. the so-called screwdriver plants). Negotiations
on TRIMs should address two aspects: (i) the liberalisation of performance requirements re-
stricting the activities of foreign investors, such as minimum requirements in terms of export
shares and local content, and (ii) stricter rules on the applicability of anti-dumping procedures
to foreign investments, e.g. in the case of non-compliance with local-content requirements.
Fourth, the liberalisation of TRIMs might be easier to achieve once restrictive business
practices of multinational corporations, which presently escape GATT monitoring and sur-
veillance, are tackled by international competition rules. Principally, such rules would be su-
perior to discretionary anti-dumping actions. Multilateral negotiations would have to ensure,
however, that competition rules can be enforced without becoming a surrogate for protection-
ist industrial policies.18
Fifth, future GATT negotiations have to tackle the recent tendency of industrialised coun-
tries to establish stricter ecological standards which could be used as a new protectionist de-
vice, particularly against suppliers from Eastern Europe and developing countries.
1
6 The
same countries might be affected by outright import bans on goods the production of which is
said to cause serious environmental degradation. To prevent environmental protection from
degenerating into trade protectionism, compensation schemes for ecologically motivated trade
restrictions should be considered. For example, compensatory trade concessions for manufac-
tured exports of developing countries should be obligatory if developed countries restrict
natural resource exploitation through trade barriers.
Finally, the EC and the United States, as the critical actors regarding the future shape of the
world trading system, should launch an initiative to enable the GATT to monitor and survey
regional trade arrangements more strictly. Art. XXIV GATT must be extended in two re-
spects: (i) by a commitment towards open regionalism so that preferential trade arrangements
could be rejected as GATT inconsistent because of restrictive accession clauses, and (ii) by a
provision to compensate non-member countries whose trade is negatively affected by regional
integration. If these two requirements were met, regionalism and multilateralism could indeed
reinforce each other. Any progress in regional liberalisation, i.e. a regional "GATT-Plus" ac-
cord, would then spread beyond its primary beneficiaries. Regional integration designed in
this way would not only break the vicious circle towards an erosion of the multilateral trading
system, but may even induce a virtuous circle of mutual trade liberalisation between regional
groupings.
16 On the relations between trade and the environment, see GATT [b].19
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